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CASE NOTE
FAMILY LAW—The Wrong Side of the Coin–Policy, Permanency and the
Problem of Legal Orphans in Wyoming: In re A.D., D.D., K.D. v. Wyoming
Department of Family Services, 151 P.3d 1102 (Wyo. 2007).
Megan K. Holbrook*

INTRODUCTION
In January of 2003, the Department of Family Services (DFS) removed
C.L. and C.D.’s three minor children, D.D., K.D., and A.D. from their care.1
DFS removed the children based on allegations of physical abuse by their father
and neglect.2 Upon inspection, DFS also found the home in a ﬁlthy and unsafe
condition.3 Both the mother and father admitted to neglecting their children, and
the District Court of Platte County adjudicated the case accordingly, removing
the children from the home.4 In July of 2003, DFS returned the three children
to the care of their biological parents for a trial home placement.5 This attempt
to reunify the family ended two months later.6 DFS, once again, removed the
children from their parents, based upon new allegations of physical abuse and
neglect.7 Following the second removal, the children remained in DFS’ custody
and did not return to their biological parents’ care.8
After DFS took custody of their children, the parents became uncooperative.9
The children’s mother acted openly hostile towards the caseworker assigned to
their family.10 The parents also neglected to maintain consistent employment,
support their children, or keep a suitable home.11 The children’s father was
incarcerated during the children’s stay in foster care.12 Thus, DFS attempted to
assist the children’s mother with the goal of reuniting them with their mother
*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Johanna
Bond and Professor Tawnya Plumb for their help and encouragement, and my friends and family
for their support during this project.
1

AD, DD, KD v. Wyo. Dep’t. of Family Servs., 151 P.3d 1102,1103 (2007).

2

Id. Only the father was found to have physically abused the children. Id.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 1104.

5

Id.

6

AD, 151 P.3d at 1104.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

AD, 151 P.3d at 1104.

12

Id.
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permanently.13 The mother, however, did not comply with DFS’ requirements,
and in July of 2004 DFS ﬁled a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights,
citing a lack of progress in reunifying the family.14
The Platte County District Court held an initial hearing on the termination
petition in the spring of 2005.15 At this hearing, the court terminated the father’s
rights.16 Nevertheless, the court ruled that DFS had not shown, by clear and
convincing evidence, that placing the children in their mother’s care seriously
jeopardized their health and safety.17 Further, the court determined that DFS
did not carry its burden by proving that the mother was unﬁt to have custody
of her children.18 The district court, therefore, ordered a hearing continuation
in six months.19 The court also required DFS to retain custody of the children
while making additional efforts to rehabilitate their mother.20 The court told the
mother she had one ﬁnal chance to meet DFS’ reuniﬁcation requirements, and
ordered her to cooperate fully with DFS.21
Subsequently, DFS and the mother agreed to a case plan.22 The plan outlined
several objectives and tasks for the mother, including that she achieve emotional
stability, provide for her children, maintain a stable and safe home environment,
live a drug- and alcohol-free lifestyle, attend weekly visitations with her children,
and arrange telephone visits with them.23 In November of 2005, the district court
held a second hearing to consider DFS’ termination petition.24 The evidence
presented at this hearing established that the mother performed many of the tasks
set forth in the case plan.25 Nevertheless, because she had changed residences three
times and changed jobs once, her therapist, the children’s therapist, and the DFS
caseworker testiﬁed that she had not demonstrated a sufﬁciently stable lifestyle
to regain custody of her children.26 As a result, none of them recommended

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

AD, 151 P.3d at 1104.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

AD, 151 P.3d at 1104.

22

Id. A case plan lays out goals for a parent to complete to be better equipped to care for his
or her children; such as living a drug and alcohol free lifestyle, attending therapy sessions, ﬁnding
suitable housing, ﬁnding steady employment, etc. Id.
23

Id. at 1105.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

AD, 151 P.3d at 1105.
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reuniﬁcation.27 The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights at this
hearing, reasoning that the children needed permanency in their lives and the
extended period of foster care did nothing to advance this goal.28 Following the
district court’s decision, the mother ﬁled an appeal with the Wyoming Supreme
Court.29
When the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case in February 2007,
the three children were already adolescents at fourteen, thirteen and ten years
old.30 The Wyoming Supreme Court emphasized that the right to associate with
one’s family is fundamental, and therefore the courts must strictly scrutinize
petitions to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her children.31 Because of this
fundamental right, an agency, such as DFS, must present clear and convincing
evidence to warrant a termination of parental rights.32 The district court, in its
ruling, found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the mother’s parental
rights.33 Wyoming statutory provisions state the court may terminate the parentchild legal relationship if clear and convincing evidence establishes the child’s
parent has abused or neglected the child, reasonable efforts by an authorized
agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the
family, and the child’s health and safety are in jeopardy if he or she remains with
or returns to the parent.34 Additionally, the court may terminate the parent-child
legal relationship if the state of Wyoming has cared for the child or children in
question for ﬁfteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and there is a showing
that the parent is unﬁt to have custody and control of the child.35 After a review of
the district court’s decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court afﬁrmed and granted
DFS’ petition by permanently terminating CL’s parental rights.36
This case note looks to relevant case law and statutory history in Wyoming
to describe the current approach to termination of parental rights.37 Then, this
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

31

AD, 151 P.3d at 1105 (quoting SLB v. JEO, 136 P.3d 797, 799-800 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting
SLJ v. Dep’t of Family Servs., 104 P.3d 74, 79-80 (Wyo. 2005))).
32
AD, 151 P.3d at 1105 (citing SLJ v. Dep’t. of Family Servs., 104 P.3d 74, 79-80 (Wyo.
2005)). Clear and convincing evidence denotes proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the
contention’s truth is highly probable. Id.
33

See AD, 151 P.3d at 1105. The district court made its decision pursuant to the provisions in
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii), (v) (2007). Id.
34

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) (2007).

35

Id. at § 14-2-309(a)(v).

36

AD, 151 P.3d at 1103.

37

See infra notes 43-104 and accompanying text for a discussion on Wyoming case law and
statutory history regarding termination of parental rights.
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note offers an analysis of the court’s ruling in In re AD.38 It also examines other
jurisdictions’ statutory requirements in termination of parental rights proceedings,
and analyzes the differences between those jurisdictions’ termination statutes and
Wyoming’s current statute.39 This note also considers the problems that arise in
Wyoming regarding the court’s reliance on case plans, which are not currently
required by Wyoming’s termination statute.40 From there, this note examines
the problem of legal orphans.41 Finally, this note advances suggestions as to how
Wyoming courts and family services can work to improve the role the court plays
in deciding the fate of older children who are left in the custody of the state after
termination of parental rights.42

BACKGROUND
Prior to 1955, no statutes existed in Wyoming that conferred power on the
courts to sever the legal parent-child relationship.43 Not until the late 1950s did
the Wyoming Legislature enact the ﬁrst statute to give a court this power.44 At the
time, this was a progressive piece of legislation.45 Wyoming was one of few states
to enact such a law.46 Before the statute’s existence, there was neither common
law nor statutory law allowing the state or petitioners in adoption proceedings to
obtain permanent custody of an abused or neglected child without ﬁrst getting
the consent of the biological parents.47 Wyoming’s new law provided for a possible
severance of all parental rights when an unﬁt parent’s behavior threatened a child’s
welfare.48
The Wyoming Supreme Court decided the ﬁrst case concerning the new
termination statute in 1967.49 The county attorney of Sheridan County ﬁled a
38
See infra notes 105–125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s ruling in In re AD.
39
See infra notes 133–160 and accompanying text for an analysis of Wyoming’s statutory
requirements regarding termination of parental rights.
40
See infra notes 161–178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s reliance on the case plan.
41

See infra notes 217–249 for a discussion of legal orphans.

42

See infra notes 250–269.

43

Sidney L. Moller, Note, Termination of Parental Rights: Establishing Standards for the Wyoming
Law: In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y and Z, DS v. Dept. of Public Assistance & Social
Services, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1981).
44

WYO. COMP. STAT. § 58-701 (Supp. 1957).

45

(1958).

Robert A. Hufsmith, Note, Termination of Parental Rights, 13 WYO. L. J. 185, 185

46

Id.

47

Id. at 186.

48

Id.

49

In re Shreve, 432 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1967).
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petition to terminate Dona Shreve’s parental rights to her ﬁve children.50 The
county attorney alleged that Dona Shreve was unﬁt to have care and control of
her children because she abused and neglected them.51 As petitioner, the county
attorney asked the court to terminate the mother’s rights, and to ﬁnd a suitable
permanent guardian for the children.52 The trial court terminated the mother’s
rights citing neglect, and named the Sheridan County Department of Public
Welfare as the children’s guardian.53 Shreve appealed, arguing that the State’s
evidence against her was insufﬁcient to support the trial court’s decision to
terminate her rights.54 Ultimately, the Wyoming Supreme Court simply relied on
the lower court’s assertions, and ruled the mother neglected her children.55 Thus,
the Supreme Court afﬁrmed the lower court’s decision.56
The second case that the state supreme court decided based on the statute’s
provisions occurred in 1976.57 The case involved the deputy county and
prosecuting attorney, who petitioned to terminate the parental rights of mentally
retarded parents of an infant child.58 At the ﬁrst hearing, the district court found
the parents to be unﬁt because they unintentionally neglected their baby.59
The trial court also found the parents unable to comprehend the situation and
their actions.60 Because of the parents’ mental inability to understand, the court
determined the neglect would likely continue.61 The court ultimately ruled that
the child’s welfare took precedence over the parents’ rights and terminated the
parental rights.62
On appeal, the parents noted that the burden of proof lies with the State in
a termination of parental rights proceeding.63 This burden, they argued, should
be one of clear and satisfactory evidence.64 The parents argued that the State did

50

Id. at 271-72.

51

Id at 272.

52

Id. Shreve’s sister-in-law, brother-in-law, and mother all ﬁled offers to accept custody of the
children. Id.
53

Id.

54

Shreve, 432 P.2d at 272.

55

Id. at 272-73.

56

Id. at 273.

57

In re CM, 556 P.2d 514 (Wyo. 1976).

58

Id. at 515.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

CM, 556 P.2d at 515.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 516.

64

Id.
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not carry that burden, and the court should adjust the standard of proof to one
of clear and convincing evidence.65 The Wyoming Supreme Court noted the
statute’s silence as to the burden of proof, but dismissed the parents’ contention
that the court should designate the burden as “clear and convincing” or “clear
and satisfactory” instead of a “preponderance of the evidence.”66 Ultimately, the
supreme court found no error in the lower court’s ruling, and upheld its decision
to terminate parental rights.67
Two years later, the Wyoming Supreme Court handed down a landmark
decision that addressed evidentiary standards, the importance of strict scrutiny in
termination of parental rights proceedings, and the policy of ﬁnding permanency
for the children involved in such proceedings.68 The Sheridan County Attorney
petitioned the Sheridan County District Court to terminate the parental rights of
mother to a three-year-old child, X, based on allegations of neglect.69 The county
attorney also petitioned the court to terminate the mother’s rights to her twin
children Y and Z.70 The district court awarded custody of all three children to
the State Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, and stated that it
would review its decision within one year.71
One year later, the mother requested that the district court review its prior
decision.72 The court granted this request, and, upon that review, the court
permanently terminated the mother’s parental rights.73 The mother appealed the
district court’s decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court.74 She set out to prove
that her situation had changed for the better.75 She also claimed the State could
not, and had not shown she had neglected X, and that she was ﬁt to care for her
child.76 The mother’s main contention on appeal was that the evidence presented

65
Id. By raising the evidentiary standard to “clear and convincing,” the court acknowledged
that parents have a fundamental right to raise their own children and therefore made it harder to
terminate parental rights without strong evidence that the child would be endangered by staying
with his or her natural parents. Id.
66

CM, 556 P.2d at 518.

67

Id. at 519.

68

In re X, Y and Z, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980).

69

Id. at 913.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 914.

72

Id.

73

X, 607 P.2d at 914.

74

Id. Y and Z had serious health issues, and the mother chose not to seek reconsideration of
the court’s decision regarding them. Id.
75

Id. at 920-22.

76

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/5

6

Holbrook: Family Law - The Wrong Side of the Coin - Policy, Permanency and

CASE NOTE

2008

145

at the original trial was not sufﬁcient to justify the district court’s termination of
her rights.77
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that in In re C.M. and In re Shreve,
the plaintiffs raised the issue of the evidentiary standard courts should use when
parents are accused of abuse or neglect.78 In both cases, the court declined to deﬁne
the standard.79 The fact that the legislature failed to deﬁne the terms “neglect” and
“abuse” disturbed the court.80 Thus, the court decided to establish standards to
guide courts in future decisions regarding claims of parental abuse or neglect.81
The court determined that it must always apply the most rigorous scrutiny
possible in reviewing claims to terminate parental rights.82 The court further
acknowledged parents’ fundamental right to raise their own children.83 Thus, a
court must only make the decision to terminate parental rights when there is
clear and unequivocal evidence, established by close scrutiny that a child’s wellbeing is in jeopardy because of a parent’s neglect or abuse.84 Ultimately, the court
reversed the lower court’s decision and returned X to his mother’s custody.85 In
reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court made a distinction between an
occasionally messy home and an excessively and continuously unkempt home that
creates ﬁre and sanitary risks.86 The court also emphasized that most parents fall
short of perfection in many ways when it comes to raising their children.87 Thus,
the court noted, the issue was not whether foster parents could do a better job
than the natural parents, but whether the natural parent has actually neglected a
child to the extent that would justify separating parent and child permanently.88
Following its determination that clear and convincing evidence is appropriate
in termination proceedings, the Supreme Court reprimanded the lower court’s
actions.89 The court criticized the lower court for taking the child away from his
mother while allowing reconsideration a year later, and ruled that the statute does

77

X, 607 P.2d at 914.

78

Id. at 917.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

X, 607 P.2d at 918.

83

Id. at 919.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 923.

86

Id. at 922.

87

X, 607 P.2d at 922.

88

Id.

89

See id. at 921-22.
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not allow a judge to keep a child’s future uncertain.90 The supreme court also
admonished the district court for forcing X to adjust to two different foster care
homes while his mother waited for reconsideration.91 By making a non-decision,
amounting to a temporary order concerning the child’s fate, the lower court not
only prevented X from living with his mother, but also effectively prevented X’s
possible adoption.92
In 1981, the Wyoming Legislature repealed the then-existing termination
of parental-rights statute, and replaced it with the current statute.93 This current
statutory version essentially codiﬁed the In re X decision.94 In response to the
holding in that case, the new statute explicitly provided speciﬁc deﬁnitions for
abuse and neglect.95 The new statute also set the standard of proof required
for termination.96 The earlier statute did not specify the standard of proof in
termination cases, leaving courts with the burden to decide the standard of proof
to accept in each case.97
The new statute explicitly requires “clear and convincing” proof that a child’s
health and well-being are in jeopardy by remaining with the natural parents in
order to terminate a parent’s rights.98 The new standard eliminates the court’s
need to determine the standard of proof on a case-by-case basis, but does not go
so far as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.99 The statute also adopted
the In re X court’s emphasis on parental rights by omitting language referring to
“best interests of the child.”100 Even if someone else does a better job raising the
child in question, this is not reason enough to remove him or her from the child’s
natural parents.101 Rather, according to the statute, the child must be in a situation
dangerous enough to jeopardize his or her well-being before the court may take the
child away from his or her parents permanently.102 Thus, the Wyoming courts and
90

Id. at 916.

91

Id.

92

X, 607 P.2d at 916.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2007). The current version of the statute speciﬁcally requires
an evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence in termination cases. Id.
93

94
See Becky Klempt, Comment, Family Law—Wyoming’s New Termination of Parental Rights
Statute, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 621, 622 (1982).
95

Id. at 623-24 (explaining the new statute cross-references to another section of Title 14,
where the deﬁnitions are found).This eliminates the need for courts to speculate as to the legislature’s
intent concerning these deﬁnitions. Id.
96

Id. at 624.

97

Id.

98

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a) (2007).

99

Klempt, supra note 94, at 624-25.

100

Id. at 627.

101

Id. at 626.

102

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) (2007).
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legislature followed the United States Supreme Court’s holding that the parents’
right to raise their own children, free from State interference, is fundamental.103
The court will separate children from their natural parents only if their continued
health and well-being is actually in serious jeopardy from the parents’ actions.104

PRINCIPAL CASE
After its review of the district court’s ruling, the Wyoming Supreme Court
handed down the In re AD decision in February of 2007.105 Justice Kite wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Voigt and Burke.106 Justice Hill ﬁled a
dissenting opinion which Justice Golden joined.107 C.L., the mother and petitioner,
asked the Wyoming Supreme Court to reverse the decision made by the Platte
County District Court to terminate her parental rights to her three children.108
C.L. argued primarily that the evidence presented by DFS was insufﬁcient to
separate her permanently from her children.109 The Wyoming Supreme Court’s
opinion began with a statement of recognition that the right to associate with one’s
family is a fundamental one, and that the court is bound to apply nothing short of
the strictest, most rigorous scrutiny to the evidence when deciding a termination
of parental rights case.110 In its opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court examined
the evidence pertaining to the mother’s ﬁtness and the evidence concerning the
health and safety of the children as interrelated.111
The mother argued the district court erred by failing to recognize her
compliance with the case plan, and the court should have measured her ﬁtness
to care for her children by her situation at the time of the second hearing.112 She
complied with almost all of the objectives set forth in the case plan, and had made
signiﬁcant efforts to rehabilitate herself.113 Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme
Court ultimately decided the district court’s ruling promoted the children’s interest
in a safe and stable home, outweighing the mother’s rights as a parent.114

103

X, 607 P.2d at 918, (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
104

X, 607 P.2d at 919.

105

AD, DD, KD v. Wyo. Dep’t. of Family Servs., 151 P.3d 1102,1103 (2007).

106

Id.

107

Id. at 1110.

108

Id. at 1105.

109

Id. at 1106.

110

AD, 151 P.3d at 1106; see also SLB, 136 P.3d at 799-800; TF v. Dep’t of Family Servs., 120
P.3d 992, 1000 (Wyo. 2005).
111

AD, 151 P.3d at 1106.

112

Id. at 1108.

113

Id. at 1108-10.

114

Id. at 1110.
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In his dissent, Justice Hill focused on the fact that the record did not contain
clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of the mother’s parental
rights.115 Justice Hill’s dissent reasoned the mother complied as well as the court
could reasonably have expected.116 The dissent also noted that many of the
mother’s failings with respect to the case plan were completely reasonable.117 The
Wyoming Supreme Court’s majority opinion faulted her for losing one of her
part-time jobs, but she lost it because she left work to avoid missing a visit with
her children.118 The case plan also required her to maintain full-time employment
so she could support her children, but again the court criticized her because her
full-time employment status would prevent her from spending time with her
children.119 She progressed enough in her work with a therapist to only need
sessions twice a month.120 Nevertheless, the court chastised her for not seeing the
therapist every week.121
Thus, as the dissent pointed out, the court based its conclusion that the mother
was unﬁt only on evidence of those minor, reasonable failings.122 The dissent also
noted the district court and DFS took the position that any hint of failure to
live up with the case plan after six months would result in the termination of the
mother’s parental rights.123 Additionally, DFS took the stance that if the children
ended up back with their mother, it would refuse to continue to work with the
family.124 In conclusion, the dissent argued that the majority refused to consider
the totality of the mother’s circumstances in ruling on her case.125

ANALYSIS
The Wyoming Supreme Court erred by upholding the lower court’s decision
to terminate C.L.’s parental rights.126 Instead, it should have returned the children
115

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

116

AD, 151 P.3d at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting). At the time of the ﬁrst petition to terminate
both the father’s and the mother’s rights, the district court found there was not sufﬁcient evidence to
support terminating the mother’s rights, nor was there evidence that living with her would jeopardize
her children. Id. Following the court’s determination that she neglected her children, it ordered DFS
to continue rehabilitation efforts with the mother. Id. While the mother was not able to comply
100% with the case plan, the court conceded that her efforts were, to a vast extent, successful. Id.
117

Id. at 1111-12 (Hill, J., dissenting).

118

Id. at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting).

119

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

120

Id. at 1111-12. (Hill, J., dissenting). This was according to the therapist herself. Id.

121

AD, 151 P.3d at 1111-12 (Hill, J., dissenting).

122

Id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

123

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

124

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

125

See id. at 1111-12 (Hill, J., dissenting).

126

See AD, 151 P.3d. at 1110.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/5

10

Holbrook: Family Law - The Wrong Side of the Coin - Policy, Permanency and

CASE NOTE

2008

149

to their mother’s care, with continued support and resources from DFS.127 This
would ideally result in the family’s successful reuniﬁcation and rehabilitation, and
promote the family’s long-term solidity.128 The analysis examines the speciﬁc role
of DFS and multi-disciplinary teams in termination proceedings.129 It focuses on
the current statute governing termination of parental rights in Wyoming, then
looks closely at the court’s consideration of the case plan and the obstacles the
mother faced in attempting full compliance with its terms.130 The analysis then
looks to Wyoming’s lack of adherence to the requirements if the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA), and the problem of judicially created orphans as a
result.131 Finally, it examines permanency planning, especially for older children,
in termination proceedings, in other jurisdictions, and advance suggestions as to
how Wyoming may follow such examples to improve the lot of older children and
adolescents whose parents’ rights are legally terminated.132

Department of Family Services and Multi-Disciplinary Teams
In Wyoming, statutes govern the Department of Family Services and its
role in termination of parental rights proceedings.133 As the state youth services
authority, the law charges DFS with the responsibility to “work with children and
families in order to encourage the resolution of intrafamily problems through
counseling and other services.”134 According to the statute, DFS shall “work on
reuniting youth with their families in cases where the child has been placed out of
the home and where additional work needs to be done in order for the youth to
be reintegrated into the family.”135
Despite the authority DFS possesses that allows it to intervene in families,
DFS social workers do not recommend or control placement decisions
concerning children in termination proceedings.136 Instead, according to another
Wyoming statute, the court must appoint a multi-disciplinary team (MDT)
to make recommendations in child-protection cases, including termination of
127

Id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

128

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

129

See infra notes 133-143 for a discussion of DFS and MDTs in termination proceedings.

130

See infra notes 144-160 for an analysis of Wyoming’s statute governing termination of
parental rights.
131

See infra notes 179-249, discussing Wyoming’s lack of adherence to ASFA and an analysis
of the problem of legal orphans created by terminations.
132
See infra notes 250-269 for a discussion of more successful procedures in other jurisdictions
and how Wyoming can move forward.
133

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-2101 (2007). This statute deﬁnes DFS’ duties and responsibilities.

134

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-2101(e)(ii) (2007).

135

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-2101 (e)(iii) (2007).

136

Tony Lewis, The State’s Challenge For Children in Custody, 24-DEC WYO. LAW. 24, 24

(2001).
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parental rights proceedings.137 By and large, the courts tend to follow MDT’s
recommendations concerning a child’s long-term placement.138 The MDT
does not have the authority to termination parental rights, but instead makes
a recommendation to the court regarding the child’s case.139 Along with its
recommendations, the MDT must also submit a case plan for the child and family
in question.140 If the MDT recommends termination of parental rights, then the
court may order DFS to begin termination proceedings.141 Failure to put together
an MDT to make a recommendation may result in the court refusing to terminate
parental rights.142 DFS’ own analysis of whether this current process is effective
indicates that there is a lack of consistent standards statewide, and that there is a
need to develop consistent operation and standards for MDTs.143

Statutory Provisions
The court erred in considering the case plan that DFS submitted in its ultimate
ruling regarding C.L.’s children, and failed to properly adhere to the provisions
of Wyoming Statute §14-2-309, which governs termination of parental rights.144
The statute makes no speciﬁc mention of case plans nor does it explicitly require
137
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-427(b) (2007). The MDT must include the child’s parent,
parents, or guardian, a representative of the school district who has direct knowledge of the child,
a representative from DFS, the child’s mental health professional if one exists, the district attorney,
the child’s attorney or guardian ad litem, a volunteer lay advocate if appointed by the court, and the
foster parent. Id. at § 14-3-427(c).
138

Lewis, supra note 136, at 24-25.

139

See In re HP, 93 P.3d 982, 982 (Wyo. 2004).

140

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-427(n) (2007).

141

See Lewis, supra note 136, at 24-25.

142

See In re FM, 163 P.3d 844, 844 (Wyo. 2007).

143

Lewis, supra note 136, at 24-25.

144

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2007). This statute states:
(a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of
the following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:
(i) The child has been left in the care of another person without provision
for the child’s support and without communication from the absent parent
for a period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination,
the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts
and communications;
(ii) The child has been abandoned with no means of identiﬁcation for
at least three (3) months and efforts to locate the parent have been
unsuccessful;
(iii) The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable
efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have
been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused
rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child’s health and safety
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the
parent;
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their use in termination proceedings.145 The court made an erroneous decision to
terminate the mother’s parental rights based on a failure to comply 100% with the
case plan.146
Wyoming precedent, expressly discussing termination of parental rights,
states that under the rule requiring the court to strictly construe the statute, the
court must not consider any ground not speciﬁcally included in the statute as a
basis for terminating a parent’s legal relationship with his or her children.147 The

(iv) The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a
showing that the parent is unﬁt to have the custody and control of the
child;
(v) The child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state
of Wyoming for ﬁfteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months,
and a showing that the parent is unﬁt to have custody and control of the
child;
(vi) The child is abandoned at less than one (1) year of age and has been
abandoned for at least six (6) months;
(vii) The child was relinquished to a safe haven provider in accordance
with W.S. 14-11-101 through 14-11-109, and neither parent has
afﬁrmatively sought the return of the child within three (3) months from
the date of relinquishment.
(b) Proof by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has been convicted of
any of the following crimes may constitute grounds that the parent is unﬁt to have
custody or control of any child and may be grounds for terminating the parent-child
relationship as to any child with no requirement that reasonable efforts be made to
reunify the family:
(i) Murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent or
aiding and abetting, attempting, conspiring to commit or soliciting such
a crime; or
(ii) Commission of a felony assault which results in serious bodily injury
to a child of the parent. As used in this paragraph “serious bodily injury”
means as deﬁned by W.S. 6-1-104.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, evidence that
reasonable efforts have been made to preserve and reunify the family
is not required in any case in which the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(i) The parental rights of the parent to any other child have been
terminated involuntarily;
(ii) The parent abandoned, chronically abused, tortured or sexually
abused the child; or
(iii) Other aggravating circumstances exist indicating that there is
little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful
reuniﬁcation.
145

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2007).

146

See id.

147

See In re SCN, 659 P.2d 568, 572 (Wyo. 1983).
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case plan was a part of DFS’ overall attempt to help the mother.148 DFS created
the case plan in an attempt to ensure that the mother would be better equipped
to care for her children; however, a case plan is not a speciﬁc requirement within
the termination of parental rights statute.149 The court, therefore, inappropriately
considered the extent of the mother’s compliance with the case plan as a basis to
terminate her parental rights.150 Other jurisdictions have explicitly included case
plans in termination of parental rights statues, which the parent or parents must
comply with to regain or keep custody of their children.151 The Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act also includes a provision for the court to consider a case
plan as part of the process of rehabilitation in a termination proceeding.152 In such
jurisdictions a case plan serves as an ofﬁcially sanctioned and regulated measuring
stick to determine the probability of a successful long-term reuniﬁcation.153
Despite the lack of statutory authorization to rely solely on the case plan,
the Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that if there had been total and complete
compliance with the case plan, the mother would have been ﬁt to regain custody
of her children.154 Conversely, if the mother lacked total and complete compliance,
the Supreme Court would have considered this an establishment of clear and
convincing evidence that the mother was unﬁt.155 Wyoming’s current termination
statute omits any deﬁnite mention of case plans; therefore, courts should only
use them as a tool to measure progress and gauge a parent’s desire as well as
genuine efforts to make the changes deemed necessary.156 Thus, the court should
only consider noncompliance with the case plan as a complete bar to eventual
reuniﬁcation if such noncompliance plainly demonstrates a parent’s blatant
disinterest or signiﬁcant inability to make efforts to regain custody of his or her
children; as opposed to enforcing a case plan that amounts to a serious of hoops
through which a parent must jump, and imposes unrealistic goals on people living
below middle-class status.157 In this case, the evidence showed that the mother
complied to a great extent with the case plan requirements, demonstrating her
sincere desire to reunite with her children.158 Moreover, there was no evidence
148
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-2101 (2007) (deﬁning DFS’ duties towards families it becomes
involved with).
149

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2007).

150

See In re SCN, 659 P.2d at 572.

151

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260C.301(5)(i), (ii) (2007).

152

Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(16) (1997).

153

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260C.301(5)(i), (ii); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (2007).

154

AD, 151 P.3d at 1109.

155

Id. at 1110.

156

See SCN, 658 P.2d at 572.

157

See J. Bohl, “Those Privileged Long Recognized”: Termination of Parental Rights Law, the
Family Right to Integrity, and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 357
(1994).
158

AD, 151 P.3d at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting).
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showing her disinterest in making the efforts necessary to reunite with her
children.159 Nevertheless, the court dismissed her efforts to comply with the case
plan.160

Case Plan Consideration
It was unreasonable for the court to fault the mother for her shortcomings
in this case because complete compliance with the plan was not possible.161 Her
failures regarding the case plan were a result of her efforts to comply with other
requirements.162 For example, she lost one of her jobs because she left early, which
taken on its own could be an irresponsible decision.163 She chose to leave work,
however, because she was unwilling to miss visitation with her children that had
just been set on a new schedule.164 The case plan required her to arrive on time to
every scheduled visit with her children.165 Rather than risk missing the visit, she
chose to leave work early.166 Unfortunately, that choice ultimately caused the loss
of the job.167
Additionally, the case plan required that the mother attain emotional stability
and mental health.168 Other courts have held that a parent’s emotional stability
is only one factor that affects a child’s well-being, and not the most important
one.169 Additionally, the same court held it determinative when a mental health
professional endorsed the parent.170 The Supreme Court failed to consider that the
mother completed a number of therapy sessions, and had progressed in therapy
so much that her therapist felt it beneﬁcial to reduce her sessions.171 The court
should have recognized this signiﬁcant progress, and committed to the family by
ordering her to continue in therapy and followed up with her case after returning
her children to her care.172

159

Id. at 1110-11 (Hill, J., dissenting).

160

Id. at 1109-10.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting).

163

AD, 151 P.3d at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting).

164

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

165

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

166

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

167

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

168

AD, 151 P.3d at 1106.

169

Angelone v. Angelone, 404 N.E.2d 672, 673 (Mass. 1980).

170

Id.

171

AD, 151 P.3d at 1110-11 (Hill, J., dissenting).

172

See 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(n) (2007).
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Obstacles in Complying With the Case Plan
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s reliance on the case plan was also problematic
because the plan failed to consider properly the obstacles the mother faced in
complying with it.173 In many cases, family services and the foster care system
serve primarily poor children and their families.174 Often, many of the parents
involved in these proceedings live in poverty, as was the mother here.175 Poverty
makes fulﬁlling basic needs, such as ﬁnding and maintaining shelter, obtaining
health care, or even providing food and clothing, far more difﬁcult.176 If the
mother in this case had cavalierly ﬂaunted the case plan requirements, thereby
demonstrating her unwillingness to change her lifestyle, even at the risk of losing
her children forever, the court would have been more justiﬁed in relying on that
fact.177 The mother, however, clearly made great efforts to comply with the plan
requirements, successfully completing nearly all of them, despite the inherent
obstacles she faced while doing so.178

Concurrent Adoption Planning
The court erred in permanently terminating the parental rights without
knowing that the children involved would actually ﬁnd permanency afterwards.179
While DFS attempted reuniﬁcation, no concurrent permanency planning took
place.180 This illustrates Wyoming courts’ lack of adherence to federal requirements
laid out in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).181 ASFA’s provisions
eliminate the problem of children waiting indeﬁnitely in foster care by requiring
courts to hold a permanency hearing within twelve months of the child’s entry
into foster care.182 If it deems best, the court then orders termination of parental
rights to free the child in the proceeding for adoption.183 ASFA also requires,
173
Elizabeth D. Jones & Karen McCurdy, National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse:
The Links Between Types of Maltreatment and Demographics, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 201,
201(1992).

NORA S. GUSTAVSSON & ELIZABETH A. SEGAL, CRITICAL ISSUES
(Sage Publishing 1994).
174

IN

CHILD WELFARE 94

175
See U.S. Advisory Bd. On Child Abuse & Neglect, A Nation’s Shame: Fatal Child Abuse and
Neglect in the United States 13 (1995).
176

Jones & McCurdy, supra note 173, at 201.

177

See Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the Case For
“Impermanence”, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 448 (2005).
178

AD, 151 P.3d at 1111 (Hill, J., dissenting).

179

See id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

180

Id.

181

See Thomas Wade Young & Jae M. Lee, Responding To The Lament of Invisible Children:
Achieving Meaningful Permanency for Foster Children, 72 J. KAN. B.A. 46, 47-48 (2003); see also
42 U.S.C. §675 (2007).
182

See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1997).

183

Id.
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concurrent with the initiation of termination proceedings, the initiation of the
process of identifying, recruiting, processing, and approving a qualiﬁed family
for adoption.184 By simultaneously planning for both outcomes, the court ensures
that children are not simply sent back to foster care or a group home without an
adoptive situation in place when it terminates parental rights.185
The court stated that its policy was to promote permanency and stability
in the lives of the children involved in the proceeding.186 Despite this, the court
made no effort to help ﬁnd a viable permanency option for the children upon
permanent removal from their mother’s care.187 Consequently, the children went
straight back into DFS’ custody, likely either ending up in foster care or a group
home situation.188 While a short period in temporary foster care is acceptable, at
ages fourteen, thirteen and ten, the children in this proceeding are unlikely to exit
foster care into an adoptive family.189 The court’s decision to send them back into
DFS’ custody amounted to sentencing them to permanent foster care or group
home, with little hope of ﬁnding an adoptive family situation.190 This decision
also exposed the children to the risks often faced by teenagers who age out of the
foster care system.191

Current Problems in Wyoming
The In re A.D. decision did not change the law; rather, this decision reﬂects
Wyoming law as it currently relates to children involved in termination of parental
rights cases.192 This case does nothing more than illustrate the existing problems
relating to the policy of permanency for children and the lack of effective standards
in Wyoming courts’ termination rulings.193 Traditionally, Wyoming courts have
been reluctant to terminate parental rights without serious cause.194 The children
in such cases are subject to statutory provisions requiring separation from their
families for at least ﬁfteen months before the State may initiate termination
proceedings.195 Furthermore, many of these children have gone through one or

184

Id. at § 671(a)(15)(F).

185

Young & Lee, supra note 181, at 53.

186

AD, 151 P.3d at 1108.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

189

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

190

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

191

Alice Bussiere, Permanence For Older Foster Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 231, 232 (2006).

192

See AD, 151 P.3d at 1103.

193

See generally AD, 151 P.3d 1102; see also Lewis, supra note 136, at 25.

194

See, e.g., AD, 151 P.3d 1102; SLB, 136 P.3d 797.

195

AD, 151 P.3d at 1102.
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more periods of attempted rehabilitation and, possibly, one or more attempted
reuniﬁcations before DFS ﬁles a ﬁnal termination of parental rights petition.196
With parents’ fundamental right to raise their own children free from state
interference in mind, courts make the decision to terminate parental rights as a last
resort.197 Thus, a court’s goal in terminating the parental rights includes freeing
the child for adoption if it considers termination in the child’s best interest.198
In situations where termination of parental rights is at stake, courts and family
service agencies tend to consider the child’s adoption the most permanent possible
outcome for children who have been severed from their parents.199 There is no
statutory requirement that an adoptive family be found and waiting to take the
children after termination of the biological parent-child relationship.200 This
situation exists despite the court’s policy of promoting permanency by freeing
children for adoption.201 Inevitably, many children ﬁnd themselves in the foster
care system after being taken from their parents, and must linger there until an
agency ﬁnds adoptive parents for them, growing less likely the older the children
get.202
By the time a termination actually takes place, these children have likely
already gone through considerable upheaval for an extended period of time.203
Most children will have likely undergone a long period of uncertainty and trauma
leading up to the termination hearing.204 Often this initial uncertainty relates to
these children being taken from their parents.205 From the child’s point of view, “a
bad home with his or her natural parents may be preferable to an excellent foster
home” with strangers.206 The uncertainty and trauma grow as the children go
back and forth between foster care and home while the system attempts parental
rehabilitation.207 Thus, a ﬁnal termination decree may amount to nothing more

196

Id.

197

AD, 151 P.3d at 1109.

198

42 U.S.C. § 671(b)(15) (1997).

199

Id.

200

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-209 (2007).

201

AD, 151 P.3d at 1110. Without adoptive parents waiting to take the children when a court
orders termination, the children risk lingering indeﬁnitely in foster care. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §
671(b)(15)(C) (1997).
202

Bussiere, supra note 191, at 236.

203

Id.

204

AD, 151 P.3d at 1109-10.

205

Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing From Foster Care Reform? The Need For Comprehensive,
Realistic and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 141, 176
(2006).
206

Bohl, supra note 157, at 325.

207

AD, 151 P.3d at 1109-1110.
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than an order for continuing uncertainty and trauma if there is no permanent
placement for the child once the order is entered.
Ultimately, particularly in the case of older children, permanent removal from
their home, without an adoptive family waiting in the wings to take them, does
little to “improve their lot” or to provide stability.208 This places a heavy burden
on judges, as they know that while they are removing children from a perilous
situation, they could simultaneously be sentencing the children to a potentially
indeﬁnite period of foster care while they await adoption.209
The court reasoned that someone else other than the biological parents would
do a better job at raising the children; thus its ruling was erroneous.210 Only when
the interests of the children in question directly collide with the parents’ rights
should the court remove the children from the parents’ care.211 In this case, the
court chose to put the children into foster care rather than return them to their
mother.212 While she could not achieve perfection, she nevertheless made serious
efforts to rehabilitate and provide a decent home for her family.213 The court
could have ordered DFS to remain involved with the family and continue to offer
assistance to the mother and the children.214 It is not reasonable to expect a family
that has a background of negative history to reach DFS’ ideal standard within
such a brief time period.215 In spite of the court’s claim to be extremely tentative
to terminate parental rights, in this case the court did not take the children’s actual
fate into serious consideration when deciding their future, making no effort to
ensure permanency for them after the termination.216

The Problem of “Legal Orphans”
Only the court has the authority to terminate the parent-child relationship.217
Therefore, the court is in a position to extend its inﬂuence and authority beyond the
208

Id. at 1112 (Hill, J., dissenting).

209

See id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

210

See X, 607 P.2d at 922.

211

AD, 151 P.3d at 1109.

212

Id. at 1110.

213

Id. at 1111-12 (Hill, J., dissenting).

214

See 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(n) (2007). Such assistance could include emergency caretaker and
homemaker services; day care; crisis counseling; individual and family counseling; procedures and
arrangements for access to available emergency ﬁnancial assistance; arrangements for the provision
of temporary child care to provide respite to the family for a brief period. Id. See also WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-403 (2007) (giving courts the authority to order any party in a termination case,
including DFS, to perform any act it deems necessary).
215

Gail Vida Hamburg, An Act of Compassion May Require Some Decisive Actions to Make it
Work, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1998, § 13, at 1.
216

AD, 151 P.3d at 1110.

217

See Bohl, supra note 157, at 324.
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termination hearing to assist those children who can no longer safely remain with
their parents.218 Simply claiming to act in the child’s best interest lacks sufﬁcient
judicial and agency effort if the reality is that the child will go on to spend the
remainder of his or her adolescence in foster care or in a state institution.219
Currently, court decisions that sever children’s legal relationship with their
parents create vast amounts of “legal orphans.”220 Thus the court system, in
conjunction with family service agencies, must decide children’s fate.221 Nationwide,
126,000 children in foster care await adoption.222 Over half of these children have
already reached the age of eleven.223 Generally, adolescents lack options in this
“system.”224 Every year, approximately 20,000 children who have reached the age
of majority leave the foster care system with nowhere to go and no place to call
home.225 Many foster children who age out of the system experience numerous
difﬁculties while attempting to make their way in the world.226 Adolescents who
leave foster care without permanent family or family-like connections are more
likely to have problems with unemployment and unplanned pregnancies, to have
legal problems, to have substance abuse issues, and difﬁculties obtaining health
care.227 Additionally, these legal orphans are also less likely than their peers to
have a high school diploma or postsecondary education, or to earn enough to
support themselves.228 These issues show that it is undesirable for children to
spend their adolescence in foster care with no permanent family or family-like
relationships.229

218
Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle
Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 140 (1997).
219

Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on
Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233, 246 (1986).
Kristin Andreason, Eliminating the Legal Orphan Problem, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
351, 351 (2003). These legal orphans are children who may no longer live with their parents, and
cannot live with another relative. Id. at 351.
220

221

Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, Note, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of
Parens Patriae and Parents’ Consitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137, 146
(2004).
222
ACHIEVING PERMANENCY FOR ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS 39 (Claire Chimulera & Sally Inada eds., American Bar Association 2006).
223

Id. at 39.

224

Id.

225

Id. at 23.

226

Bussiere, supra note 191, at 231.

227

Id. at 232.

228

Id.

229

See id.
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Unfortunately, social workers and adoptive families usually dismiss adoption as
an option for adolescents.230 Once a child has reached the age of twelve, the chances
of adoption become extremely slim.231 Federal law provides a role for the courts by
requiring states to obtain a court determination that the court and other agencies
made reasonable efforts to place foster children in a permanent placement in a
timely manner.232 The federal government requires this determination regardless
of the child’s age at the time he or she enters foster care.233 In fact, if states do not
meet the requirement in a number of cases, the law may disqualify any state from
receiving federal ﬁnancial awards for that case, and could even face sanctions.234
In 2004, no state achieved substantial conformity with the permanency goals put
in place by the federal government.235 This evidences that Wyoming is not alone
in failing to provide permanency for “legal orphans.”236
Federal law encourages permanency for children.237 In In re AD, the desire
to create permanency for the three children motivated the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s decision.238 The court ruled as though simply terminating the parental
rights and freeing the children for adoption amounted to an accomplishment
of that goal.239 While a child with living parents cannot be adopted without
termination of the natural parents’ rights, terminating parental rights does not
itself accomplish the goal of permanency.240 When the State takes a child into
foster care, it takes complete control over that child’s family situation.241 Such
a responsibility is immense; the state should not limit its inﬂuence to the mere
provision of continued foster care for legal orphans that result from the termination
of parental rights proceedings.242
The court should not intervene to the extent that it does in these cases without
actually providing a better situation for the children in question.243 Termination
of parental rights exists to protect and rescue children who are subjected to
230

Chimulera, supra note 222, at 6.

231

Bussiere, supra note 191, at 236. It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd families willing to adopt older children.

232

Id. at 237.

233

Id.

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Bussiere, supra note 191, at 237.

237

ASFA, PL 105-89 (1997).

238

AD, 151 P.3d at 1110.

239

Id.

240

Andreason, supra note 220, at 351.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

See id. at 351-52.

Id.
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horrible abuse by their own parents, and to provide for them when their natural
parents neglect them.244 For many children, foster care constitutes a refuge, a
place where they will be safely taken care of, decidedly better than remaining with
or returning to their natural parents.245 Placing children in foster care when such
abuse or neglect exists is absolutely the proper function of the foster care system
and by extension of termination of parental rights.246 Because the children in In
re AD are already adolescents, and their mother was not herself abusive towards
them, the foster care system will likely not provide a better situation than the one
they would have had with their mother.247 She made signiﬁcant progress in her
attempts to ameliorate her lifestyle and create a better home for her family.248 In
this situation, the court ruled to terminate her parental rights without actually
ensuring that the children’s lives would truly be better as a result. To remove the
children only to send them into foster care, unlikely to be adopted, with a future
then possibly complicated by homelessness, lack of education, lack of livelihood
or legal troubles is unacceptable.249

Moving Forward in Wyoming
Other states have set an example for Wyoming, by enacting programs to help
families and children involved in termination proceedings.250 Such programs offer
recruitment strategies to ﬁnd families interested in adopting older children.251
Speciﬁc strategies for older children’s adoption must be in place because
adolescents’ adoptions differ from those of younger children.252 For example,
families are more likely to want to adopt an adolescent once they get to know
the individual teenager.253 Emotional connection seems to be the key; successful
adolescent adoptions have shown that families wanted to adopt when they made
a connection with a speciﬁc child, or when they learned of a speciﬁc adolescent in
need of a home.254
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Some successful programs in other states focus on ﬁnding permanent
connections for the adolescents rather than focusing purely on ﬁnding adoptive
placements.255 These programs result in the legal formality of adoption evolving
naturally out of the relationships that form.256 Such programs require ﬂexibility
and persistence to succeed, and often the youths themselves turn out to be the best
resources for identifying individuals in their lives, or from their pasts, who might
want to adopt them.257 The attitude of child welfare professionals also constitutes
an important component in the success of these programs.258 The dissent in In re
AD suggested that DFS had no interest in continuing to work with the family or
the children beyond the conclusion of the termination hearing.259 The programs
that succeed in making a positive difference in advancing permanency, however,
rely heavily on staff members who really believe in the possibility of ﬁnding
families for adolescents.260
Even before a termination hearing, Wyoming could consider alternative
procedures in child protection situations. Frequently, child protection litigation
can be a very adversarial process; damaging to families and children.261 Often,
such litigation fails to provide appropriate and timely resolution of problems.262
Child protection mediation programs can alleviate some of the damaging results
of adversarial litigation involving children’s fates.263 Mediation can occur at any
time in a child protection case.264 These programs seek to empower the different
participants in the situation, and to encourage the family to work together
to create an individualized and personal solution to the problems facing the
family.265 Such programs provide more direct assistance to families who may be
facing serious problems leading to a termination hearing.266 Perhaps families and
agencies would ﬁnd more effective solutions to serious problems if they paid more
attention to the individual circumstance of every family’s situation.267 Massive
power imbalances exist between parents and the caseworkers who dictate the
parents’ time with their children and, ultimately, have the power to take children
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away if termination is in question.268 With mediation, it also becomes possible to
spend more time examining and understanding the personal, cultural, familial
and/or environmental stresses, patterns, and deprivations that parents face and
how these factors relate to neglectful or abusive situations.269 Conventional
wisdom would dictate that agencies working with families will not ﬁnd solutions
without understanding the root problems and issues.

CONCLUSION
The Wyoming court system, as well as agencies such as DFS, should increase
or renew efforts to ﬁnd permanency for children of all ages when courts remove
them from their parents because of abuse or neglect, which is, unarguably, good
policy.270 Today, however, a need exists to reform Wyoming’s statutes regarding
termination and the intertwining roles that the courts, DFS and MDTs purport
to play together, as the current system lacks uniform standards and application
across the state.271
Rescuing children from danger when their parents cannot be entrusted with
their care constitutes one of the only acceptable state interferences in family life.272
Nevertheless, courts must also adopt a policy to ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, that a permanent family situation awaits older children after termination
of parental rights.273 If a child stays in foster care or group homes until the age of
eighteen, he or she may have difﬁculties ﬁnding a permanent home or positive
support system.274 Many successful programs, implemented by other states, assist
in ﬁnding positive, permanent situations for adolescents that Wyoming should
consider.275
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Judges possess inﬂuence in these cases.276 Their role should be proactive in cases
where child abuse or neglect exists.277 Courts in Wyoming do possess authority
over any party in a termination proceeding, including DFS.278 Wyoming
statute dictates that a court may order any party to perform any acts, duties or
responsibilities it deems necessary.279 Thus there should be nothing preventing
Wyoming judges from ordering DFS to concurrently plan for adoption while
reuniﬁcation is also attempted in a termination proceeding. Courts and state
agencies should make efforts to locate people speciﬁcally willing to adopt an older
child.280 Encouraging and advocating for the development of agencies that work
speciﬁcally to ﬁnd adoptive parents for adolescents in Wyoming or the greater
Rocky Mountain region could make a great difference. These agencies could
provide post-adoption expertise for families that face the challenges in adopting
older children. Supporting the adoptive parents and the children would foster
progress and success in the adoptive relationships. Agencies could also provide a
way for older children to become active participants in the recruitment of adoptive
parents, giving them a sense of ownership and encouraging them to be an active
part of their future that they may not have had in the past.281
Courts will continue to face difﬁcult cases that involve abused and neglected
children.282 These children greatly need to ﬁnd healthy home situations after
experiencing the trauma of termination.283 Judges, lawyers, and state agencies
may be able to impact the ultimate fate of these children in an important way,
and the Wyoming system should take the initiative to make positive changes.284
Thus, Wyoming can begin to move away from a culture of eternal foster care for
abused and neglected children, and towards a more effective and stable system for
all children who come into contact with Wyoming’s courts.
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